'Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition\r'

'Strategies of Know go pastge learning Author(s): Deanna Kuhn, Merce Garcia-Mila, Anat Zohar, Christopher Andersen, Sheldon H. White, David Klahr, Sharon M. Carver Source: Monographs of the ordination for Research in Child suppuration, Vol. 60, no(prenominal) 4, Strategies of Knowledge Acquisition (1995), pp. i+iii+v-vi+1-157 Published by: Black codaly make on behalf of the Society for Research in Child composition St commensurate URL: http://www. jstor. org/stable/1166059 . Accessed: 16/09/2011 13:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the basis & Conditions of Use, available at . ttp://www. jstor. org/p masteryion/info/ astir(p blushfulicate)/policies/terms. jsp JSTOR is a non-for-profit service that helps scholars, look forers, and students disc e truly can, use, and build upon a entirely-embracing consecrate back in of substance in a rely digital archive. We use larn technology and tools to ontogenesis productivity and facilitate saucily progress tos of scholarship. For more(prenominal) information close to JSTOR, please contact [email protected] org. Black rise Publishing and Society for Research in Child Development argon collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and address access to Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development. ttp://www. jstor. org OF MONOGRAPHS THE IN FOR clubhouse RESEARCH CHILD DEVELOPMENT Serial No. 245, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1995 OF STRATEGIES lore encyclopaedism Deanna Kuhn Merce Garcia-Mila Anat Zohar Andersen Christopher BY WITH input SheldonH. White David Klahr and Sharon M. Carver BY AND A result THEAUTHORS MONOGRAPHSTHE OF SOCIETY RESEARCH FOR INCHILD DEVELOPMENT SerialNo. 245, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1995 limit ABSTRACT v I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. rule acting 24 III. friendship IN science ADULTS 33 IV. noesis IN ACQUISITION CHILDREN 42 V. STRATEGIES out stemma AND carg one(a)n ADULTS 50 IN VI.STRATEGIES STRATEGY AND CHANGE CHILDREN 64 IN VII. THE PROCESS CHANGE OF 75 VIII. CONCLUSIONS 98 REFERENCES121 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 128 COMMENTARY TOWARD EVOLUTIONARY AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF scientific abstract thought SheldonH. White 129 SCIENTIFIC THINKING ABOUT SCIENTIFIC THINKING David Klahr and Sharon M. Carver 137 REPLY SCIENTIFIC AND acquaintance THINKING ACQUISITION Deanna Kuhn 152 CONTRIBUTORS 158 STATEMENT OF EDITORIAL policy 160 ABSTRACT KUHN, DEANNA; GARCIA-MILA,MERCE; ZOHAR, ANAT; and ANDERSEN, CHRISTOPHER. WithCommentary Strategiesof KnowledgeAcquisition. nd H. KLAHR SHARON CARVER; and SHELDON sporty by DAVID M. by KUHN. and a Reply by DEANNA theSociety Research in Monographs of for Child 1995, 60(4, SerialNo. 245). Development, In this Monograph, is familiarity learnedness run intodas a offshootinthe coordinationof existing theorieswith saucy at leaven. Although volving tasteers larning impressionual substitute realise described barbarianrensevolving theories at heart umteen scopes,relatively slim attentionhas been condition to the mechanisms meansof whichtheories atomic number 18 formed and revisedand by friendshipis thitherbyacquired.Centralto the pitch liveis the asseveratethat strategiesof acquaintance eruditenesswhitethorn vary evidentiallycrosswise (as come up as at heart) separatesand crowd out be abstractized inwardly a develop amiable frame charm. To studythese strategiesand their culture,we use a micro inherited mode acting. Our application the system allowsextendedobservation the of of of skill cognitionwithina state,of the strategies utilize to acquire this noesis,and of the miscellaneain these strategies over date.The method also allows qualitative synopsisof undividedsand quantitativeanalysisof comp boths to be used in complementary steerings. Knowledge learnedness routineeswereexaminedat dickens while directs. biotic community college magnanimouss and preadolescents violateicipatedin cardinal 30-45-min personsessionseach week over a 10-week period. Subjects fielded on puzzlesinvolvinga all-inclusive range of cognitive guinea pigfrom just rough(prenominal) physicaland accessible sectors. A ecstasy traffic pattern was situated within this microgeneticframework,for the purposeof rateing inductionof strategies withthe design of unexampled up to(p).Subjectsof some(prenominal) develops tryedprogresscrosswi pilehe 10 weeksin the level of strategiesused as hygienic as sympatheticity the form that this progresstook. in levelsthatdid non vary amplely,childrenshowed condescension sign doing V less strategic onward motion than swelleds and inferior companionship acquisition. Strategic progress was retained by both groups when parvenue(a)fangled difficulty capacityed was introduced mid steering d ace the sessions. The results thus indicate signifi give the axet inductive logical thinking of strategies and outline veer crosswise content, as well as populations.A further indication of stimulu s inductance was the emergence of new strategies at about the like quantify in the social and physical realitys, correct though performance in the social do main(prenominal) overall lagged behind that in the physical friendship base. At the individual level, mixed usage of valid and incapacitate strategies was the norm. This purpose in an adult population suggests that this division is a more public peculiar(prenominal) of kind performance, sort of than hotshot unique to states of ontogenesisal transmutation. some former(a) big implication of this disagreement is that individual(a)-occasion assessment may appropriate an at best incomplete, and often mis lead storying, picture of an individuals approach. until now an an separate(prenominal)(prenominal) implication is that at to the lowest degree part of vari skill in performance across content resides in the survey, quite than pocketly in the undertaking. That pucka strategies perplex in an individuals repertory atomic number 18 non always utilize highlights the fact that more is bear on in fencent performance than the force to escape fixive strategies.Metastrategic competency-the ability to theorise on and address strategic noesis-and metacognitive competence-the ability to echo on the content of whiznesss cognition- be emphasized as unfavorable comp mavennts of cognitive tuition. These competencies plant the strategies that are actually used, among those authorizati completely available, and in that respectfore the military posture of an individuals performance. Finally, the aim of multiple strategies and multiple forms of competence greatly complicates the portrayal of learningal diversity. Rather than a nidimensional transition from a to b, the transform bring must be conceptualized in terms of multiple comp mavennts following individual (although not self- wageed person) paths. VI I. INTRODUCTION Knowledge acquisition is a emergence funda psychic to survival that begins primaeval and continues throughout the life span. What do we know of the do work? Research within the last decade has make it clear that from an previous(predicate) age knowledge is nonionised into theories that are elaborate and revised over time and that serve as vehicles for understanding the world.In other words, knowledge acquisition to a puffy degree eliminates through a deal of possibleness formation and revision. Among inquiryers adopting a knowledge- or surmisal- ground approach to cognitive maturation, the centralise has been on describing the content of these evolving theories in a wide range of domains, and we now know a unassailable deal about the progressively more elaborated knowledge that children of various ages are likely to demand within numerous content domains (Gelman & Wellman, in concentrate; Wellman & Gelman, 1992).In contrast, relatively undersize attention has been given to the mathematical process of knowle dge acquisition itself, that is, the mechanisms by means of which theories are formed and revised and knowledge is thereby acquired. It is this proposition that is the focus of the indue work. Within the knowledge-based approach, the trust that has been at to the lowest degree implicit, and is occasionally voiced explicitly (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985a, 1986), is that these mechanisms uphold more or less constant across development.The kick in work rests on a some(prenominal)ise claim that strategies of knowledge acquisition vary consequentially across (as well as within) individuals and freighter be conceptualized in developgenial terms. noesis AS ACQUISITION THEORY-EVIDENCE COORDINATION The general form of knowledge and knowledge acquisition studied here is that of the relation amongst one category of take and some other. well-nigh usually, such(prenominal)(prenominal) dealing are cons neatd causatively (Cheng & Nisbett, 1993), with an preceding category of variety show surfacet imageed as influencing an outcome IKUHNETAL. category (e. g. , uptake of solid food and a childs bodily growth). Underpinning this form of knowledge is a more basic one having to do with how all the samets or determinations fit together into categories (e. g. , foods, nonfoods, and permanent vs. momentary bodily changes). Although the latter is not examined here, both forms of knowledge touch theories as organizing devices (Barrett, Abdi, Murphy, & Gallagher, 1993; Keil, 1991; Medin, 1989; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994).Childrens and adults theories about causative dealing undergo revision as new picture is encountered. Hence, knowledge acquisition strategies involve the evaluation of take the stand and inducive causative trus devilrthyty. Recent theories of inductive causative conclusion in adults (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1992) are consistent with foregoing fliers (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984; Holland, Holyoak , Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986) in attri just nowing prominent office staffs both to prior prognosis (or possibility) and to try out of covariation (of the relevant factors) in fostering illations of cause.It is unvoiced to explain not altogether simpleton concept formation (Keil, 1991) exclusively regular(a) basic teach phenomena in animals without invoking a construct that involves expectation (Holyoak, Koh, & Nisbett, 1989). A conception of inductive inference as involving a coordination of theory and curtilage (Kuhn, 1989) contrasts with earlier approaches to the development of inductive inference strategies-for archetype, the Piagetian search on musket ball operations-in which such strategies were regarded as mostly domain independent and therefore equally applicable to any content ir compliancyive of prior knowledge or expectation.In existential studies of adults multivariable inductive causal inference, looses usually are bidd with a touch on of mul tiple instances in which one or more potential reachs does or does not occur and an outcome is move over or absent (Cheng & Novick, 1990, 1991; D avowing, Sternberg, & Ross, 1985; Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). The face is asked to evaluate the exhibit and draw inferences regarding the causal good go forth of one or more of the factors.Although this approach chiffonier reveal much about how change patterns of tell affect inference, it does not lend much sharpness into the minimumconditions for an inference of former, which may be as flyspeck as a single accompaniment (of anticipatory and outcome), level(p) in the clear presence of excess covariates (Kuhn & Phelps, 1982). Moreover, in natural fastentings, even when multiple instances are quick available, there is no reason to take that individuals will seek out and attend to all of them.For both these reasons, we were interested in studying government agencys in which keep downs are innocuous to select the try on which they base their inferences, a condition that links the expose work to question on scientific reason out (Klahr, Fay, & Dunbar, 1993; Kuhn, Amsel, & OLoughlin, 1988; Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992), as we hold forth further later in this chapter. Yet the cognitive skills examined in this Monograph are, we believe, 2 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION e vexative of processes of knowledge acquisition and inductive inference more broadly (Kuhn, 1993). We therefore situate the founder work in this broader linguistic context. Methodologically, this means that we examine knowledge acquisition across a broad range of domains involving both physical and social phenomena, rather than limiting the investigation to tralatitious scientific domains. THE MICROGENETIC METHOD To study knowledge acquisition strategies and their development, we use a microgenetic method.The virtues of the microgenetic method as a tool for examining change wee-we e been elaborated in our own earlier work (Kuhn & Phelps, 1982) and more recently by Siegler and Crowley (1991). The evolution of behaviors that one cites over time in microgenetic study throne serve to corroborate cross-sectional differences in performance. almost Copernican, however, the method offers the opportunity for detailed analysis of the process of change. Later in this chapter, we summarize findings from previous research utilizing a microgenetic method.An important feature of the method is that changes over time are initiated by landing fields themselves, in fundamental interaction with the bothers genuines, rather than by the investigator, who plys no instruction or feedback with view to a subjects approaches to a trouble. The rationale is that change magnitude density of exercise of existing strategies may lead to change that, except for occurring comparatively rapidly, otherwise resembles a naturally occurring change process.The researcher is thereby afforded close observation of the process. In admission, a third potential benefit of the method is its capacity to endure a fuller, more accurate picture of competence than can be attained using a single-occasion method. If a subjects performance improves after a few sessions of engagement, it tells us that this level of performance was within the subjects capabilities and accordingly should be recognized as part of his or her competence, or â€Å"zone of proximal development” in Vygotskys (1978) terms.In some(prenominal) compliancys, the method used in the work describe in this Monograph is an elaborated form of the microgenetic method, one that has not been used in other microgenetic research. First, we simultaneously click 2 kinds of change over time within a domain. One is the subjects evolving knowledge within that domain (specifically, knowledge of the causal and noncausal relations among variables that reflect the structure of the domain). The spot kind of ch ange is in strategies of knowledge acquisition, which may also evolve as knowledge is organism acquired.In other uses of the microgenetic method, typically only one form of change has been as trustworthyed, 3 KUHNETAL. for example, in strategies for answer addition problems (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989). A second respect in which the basic microgenetic method is elaborated is that we line up change within multiple domains in which the subject is engaged at the homogeneous time. Doing so allows us to analyze both knowledge acquisition and evolving strategy usage across domains (as well as relating the two to one another within domains).We wished to examine a broad range of domains, involving both physical and social content, to establish the generality of the knowledge acquisition processes being examined. The research design thus stipulated that each subject undergo parallel engagement with one problem in the physical content domain and one problem in the social content domain. A consider of favors lead to the call upion of greater contest (and hence inferior performance) in the social domain. Among these are the possibly more extensive initial knowledge (whether or not it is correct) in the social domain and possibly greater ffective investment in this knowledge (Kunda, 1990), either of which would make the task of theory- demonstrate coordination more difficult. A third elaboration of the microgenetic method is reflected in a research design that incorporates a traditional take away design within a microgenetic framework. The purpose, again, is to establish generality of the knowledge acquisition strategies that we examine. The traditional transportation design used to assess generality of a skill across content domains is problematic for a lean of reasons that we need not review here.A further problem excludes if (as we show here to be the case) a subject at a given take down in time does not throw just a single strategy alone instead select s strategies from a repertory of multiple strategies. If so, single-occasion assessment within a single content domain may build an inaccurate and misleading characterization (since the subject could control selected a varied strategy on this finicky occasion and might do so on another occasion); in this case, accurate single-occasion assessment of generality acrossdomains is precluded.The multiple-task, multiple-occasion assessment employed here allows us to assess generality in a more moral force way than is afforded by a traditional careen design. Each subject worked on a problem in the physical domain at one each week session and a problem in the social domain at a second weekly session, for each of the firstly 5 weeks of a 10-week period of observation. At the beginning of the sixth week, new problems within each of the domains were substituted, and the sessions continued for the remaining vanadium weeks.The scruple we ask is whether the substitution of new content aff ects the strategies that the subject uses. To the end that the same set of strategies that a subject uses in the last encounters with the initial problem carries over to the new content, some degree of domain generality (of both strategies and strategy change) is indicated. A utmost elaboration of the microgenetic method is to replicate the design 4 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION with multiple age groups, modify us to compare the knowledge acquisition process across age levels.In addition to providing further certify regarding the generality of knowledge acquisition processes (across populations in this case, rather than content), this resemblance is important in addressing a more specific research. The pattern notice in our own as well as others microgenetic work has been one of mixed, or variable, strategy usage, as we describe in the next section. In other words, instead of a single, consistent approach, the subject shows variable usage of a variety of more and less competent approaches, even though the problem environment remains constant.An equivocalness arises, however, owing to the fact that the subjects observed in microgenetic work deal been either assumed or assessed to be in a state of transition with respect to the competencies in heading. It is possible, therefore, that the variable strategy usage that has been observed is a particular characteristic of a developmental transition state, as dynamic systems theories of development predict (Van der Maas & Molenaar, 1992). It thus suffers important to ask whether the same variability over repeated occasions would be observed among populations at other than a characteristic age of transition.If it is, it suggests that this variability is a more general characteristic of human performance, rather than one unique to states of developmental transition. To address this fundamental question, we chose preadolescents and community college adults as the two populations on which to base su ch a comparing. previous(prenominal) work (Klahr et al. , 1993; Kuhn et al. , 1988) establishes the preadolescent age level as one at which the strategies in question are just beginning to emerge.However, some preteen adult populations show initial levels of performance little more advanced than those characteristic of preadolescents (Kuhn et al. , 1988), change us to compare subjects of these two ages in a microgenetic design. In addition to establishing whether strategy change occurs at periods other than the typical period of developmental transition, the design allows cross-age comparison of the process of knowledge acquisition as well as of the interaction of knowledge acquisition and strategy change. Another set of questions centers on the personal effects of the exercise provided by the microgenetic method.Despite similar starting points, does one age group show more rapid evolution of strategies than another group, both having been provided comparable exercise? Does such change differ only in degree or also in form? These questions are rally to establishing the generality of knowledge acquisition strategies across populations. A final purpose of this Monographis to present a method of analysis that combines qualitative analysis of individuals with quantitative analysis of groups of individuals. Observers of the fields progress, such as White (1994a, 1994b), concur a bun in the oven lamented the circumscribed range of methods to which devel5KUHNETAL. opmental researchers have restricted themselves. Especially in undertaking to study the difficult discipline of processes of change, modern methods are called for. In particular, the study of individual subjects is receiving change magnitude attention as an important and neglected method. As a research method, however, single-subject analysis most often is handle skeptically, and even dismissed, on the assumption that it is sternly expressage by its inability to provide distinguish of the gene rality of the phenomena observed.Here, we undertake to illustrate how individual and group, as well as qualitative and quantitative, modes of analysis can be used in conjunction to provide an enriched understanding of developmental phenomena. In the next section, we discuss previous research in more detail, in order to situate the present research bm in the context of various lines of work to which it connects. The ratifier wishing to focus exclusively on the present work can proceed directly to the final section of this chapter, which introduces the inference forms that guess prominently in later chapters.THE PRESENT STUDY THE IN stage setting PASTRESEARCH OF FromLearning Conceptual qualify to It was only a few decades ago that knowledge acquisitionand learning were treated as synonymous terms, both referring to a process of strengthening of associable bonds amid stimuli and responses. In developmental psychology, Kendler and Kendler (1975) deserve the major doctrine for mo ving the field beyond a expression of the render child as a â€Å" bundle up of interrelated responses” (Bijou & Baer, 1961, p. 4) and delving into the black box that represented mental phenomena. Although the Kendlers seting of such phenomena in terms of secret stimuli and responses was extremely restrictive, they demonstrated convincingly that the learning process cannot be studied without considering the developmental status of the organism. That shrewdness remains a central one today. What individuals already know and how that knowledge is organized constrains what and how new knowledge will be acquired.The burgeoning area of research that has come to be cognise as the study of conceptual change documents the development of knowledge in numerous domains, with physics (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987, 1992) and biology (Carey, 1985b) the domains that have been the purpose of superior study. Extensive books reviews are provided by Gelman and Wellman (in press) and Wellman and Gelman (1992). The main tenet underlying and connecting these individual lines of 6 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION research is that cognitive development can be passablely accounted for in terms of developing knowledge within content domains.As a consequence, findings are largely specific to the domain studied. The major acumen that extends across domains is the theory-like organization of knowledge. Even the properties that define simple concepts cluster and mutually jump out one another. Conceptions of such homeostatic causal clusters, and the mechanisms underlying them, are the â€Å" chewing gum” that makes features cohere (Keil, 1991). At a less mere(a) level, evidence exists suggesting that young childrens theories have properties such as consistency, coherence, omnibus(prenominal)ness, and explanatory power (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992).As noted earlier, relatively little attention has been given to the m echanisms that effect theory change. When and how does new evidence lead to modification of existing theories? Despite hypothetical claims that these mechanisms are developmentally invariant (Brewer & Samarapungavan, 1991; Carey, 1985a, 1986), little empirical work has been devoted to investigating them. well-nigh research has been done to support claims that theory change will be more difficult to do if it crosses ontological categories (Chi, 1992), involves radical (vs. eak) restructuring (Carey, 1990), or violates entrenched opinions (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). save how should the mechanisms of change be conceptualized? Keil (1988, 1989, 1991) has free to this question with respect to the formation of elementary concepts, contrasting accounts maintaining (a) that such concepts arise out of networks of associations observed in the environment, (b) that the process is theory guided, or (c) that at some point a developmental shift occurs from the first to the secon d process.Keil (1991) rejects the possibilities of an exclusive associative network process and a developmental shift from such a process to a theory-guided one, asking how coherent theories could arise out of networks of associations. Instead, he proposes, all concepts represent a blend of an associative matrix overlaid with causal beliefs. Humans have evolved adaptations for create knowledge standards about sets of regularities in the world, and these processes are never completely selective information driven or completely theory driven.In the present work, we address a similar question regarding the mechanisms of conceptual change scarce in this case with respect to the secondorder concepts of relations (particularly causal relations) in the midst of elementary conceptual categories. We adopt a perspective resembling Keils that the mechanism entails the coordination of new evidence with an existing network of theories. What are the strategies that an individual uses to achi eve this coordination, and do they change with age and practice? Addressing this question leads to the topics of inductive causal inference and scientific think.First, however, we examine issues snarled in the study of change. 7 KUHNETAL. Learning,Transfer,and the Study of Change The process of knowledge acquisition is likely to figure prominently in any comprehensive theory of human cognitive functioning. One prominent example is Sternbergs (1984, 1985) triarchic theory, in which knowledge acquisition mechanisms are one of some(prenominal) core components of the intellect. But how is knowledge acquisition studied empirically? Psychologists studying very simple, short-run learning processes may be able to observe these processes directly in the laboratory.The study of more comprehensive kinds of cognitive change, however, especially those involving change in knowledge acquisition strategies themselves, poses serious methodological challenges. Developmental psychologists have bee n in the particularly difficult position of want to understand developmental change without observing it directly. As has now been widely noted, the cross-sectional and even longitudinal designs that are the staples of developmental psychology may provide suggestive entropy regarding change, entirely they do not afford direct observation of the process Wohlwill, 1973). The microgenetic method has been advocated as a way out of this impasse. As described by Kuhn and Phelps (1982), the goal of the method is to press forward the change process by providing a subject with frequent opportunities over a period of weeks or months to engage the particular cognitive strategies that are the object of investigation. This increased density of exercise of existing strategies may lead to change, allowing the researcher close observation of the process.In the initial work by Kuhn and Phelps (1982), we chose strategies of wide applicability as a basis for exploring the utility of the methodstra tegies of inductive causal inference that are fundamental to knowledge acquisition and can be identified in both scientific and informal reasoning (Kuhn, 1991, 1993). In weekly sessions, preadolescent subjects were asked to identify causal and noncausal effects as they freely investigated a domain in which multiple variables compete potential causal roles in influencing an outcome.Strategies of investigation and inference did improve in a mass of subjects over the period of observation. In a comparison condition (Kuhn & Ho, 1980), subjects each week were presented with a set of conditionoutcome instances equal to that which the subjects yoked control in the free investigation condition had selected for examination; these subjects also showed some, but less, change. Subsequent research (Kuhn et al. , 1992; Schauble, 1990, in press), including the present study, has followed this same paradigm of microgenetic examination of inductive inference strategies in multivariable cont exts.Meanwhile, other developmental researchers, notably Siegler and his colleagues (Siegler & Jenkins, 1989), began to use the microgenetic method, in Sieglers case in the very divers(prenominal) domain of elementary addition strategies. 8 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION Among other researchers who have used a microgenetic method in various domains are Bidell and Fischer (1994), Granott (1993), Karmiloff-Smith (1984), Lawler (1985), and Metz (1985, 1993). In addition, a line of Genevan work beginning with a study by Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) falls under the heading of microgenetic research.In certain respects, modern microgenetic research connects to work in the genetic tradition of Werner (1948), although the latter was limited to observation within a single session. Enough microgenetic work has accrue by now to make comparison and generalization possible (Siegler & Crowley, 1991). Studies conducted within very diametric domains show convergence in sever al important respects. Most important, they provide a clear indication of what the change process is not-simple re guidement of a less adequate approach with a more adequate one.Instead, subjects commonly exhibit intraindividual variability in the strategies that they apply to identical problems, with less adequate strategies coexisting in a subjects repertory together with more adequate ones. The initial show of a new strategy, then, does not rate its consistent application. Instead, less adequate strategies continue to compete with it, and, indeed, the more formidable challenge appears to be abandoning the old, rather than acquiring the new-a reversal in the way that development is traditionally conceived.Change does occur, but it appears as a gradatory shift in the distribution of use of a set of strategies of varying adequacy. The most recent microgenetic work (Granott, 1993; Metz, 1993) offers a number of additional insights regarding the nature of the change process. We ret urn to them in the final chapter in discussing insights from the present work. As described earlier in this chapter, a main purpose of the present work is to extend the microgenetic method in ways that address several critical questions.One is whether the variability and change observed in microgenetic studies is particular to subjects in a period of developmental transition or is a more general phenomenon. A second is the extent to which such change is general as op pose to domain specific. champaign specificity versus domain generality of cognitive strategies is a topic at the heart of much current make out in the field of cognitive development (KarmiloffSmith, 1994). In a previous study (Kuhn et al. , 1992), we addressed this question by having subjects work simultaneously in two domains, with separate sessions each week devoted to each.This study provided some evidence of generality in that improvements in strategy tended to co-occur in rough synchronism across the two domain s. These findings, however, do not provide an answer to the more traditional question of whether the pertly positive competencies would convert to new content to which the subject had not been previously exposed. This question is addressed in the present work. Studies of tilt have served as the traditional means for assessing generality: Does a newly acquired faculty lurch to a new context? 9 KUHN ET AL.Whether the subjects are preschool children or college adults, in a legal age of cases the answer has been no. Such findings have led to critical scrutiny of the transfer construct (Detterman & Sternberg, 1993) as well as increasingly domain-specific conceptions of cognitive development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Why should transfer to new contexts be anticipate? Two prevailing conceptualizations of transfer offer slenderly different answers. In the more common conceptualization, transfer is seen as middle(a)d by a symbolical representation of the problem domain ( dark-b rown, 1989, 1990; Gentner, 1983, 1989; Holyoak, 1984; Singley & Anderson, 1989).To the extent that there is overlap amid the representations of two problem domains (i. e. , the extent to which the elements of one map onto the elements of the other), transfer betwixt the two should occur. In a study by Brown and Kane (1988), for example, subjects had to recognize a connection between displace a boat ashore with a seek rod and pulling someone out of a hole with a spade. A somewhat different conception of transfer (Greeno, Smith, & Moore, 1993) emphasizes the activity that the problem convergent thinker engages in.To the extent the activity is common to two settings, transfer will occur. In the words of Greeno et al. (1993, p. 146), â€Å"The structure that enables transfer is in the interactive activity of the person in the feature. … When transfer occurs it is because of general properties and relations of the persons interaction with features of a situation. à ¢â‚¬Â It is this latter conception of transfer that fits our paradigm cleanse than the first one (which is sometimes referred to as nonliteral transfer).The strategies that subjects develop are very broadly applicable across a wide range of content, but subjects learn to apply these strategies only within the context of particular, relatively narrow content. Will these strategies generalize to new and diverse kinds of content? This classic transfer question is complicated by the findings from microgenetic research. As noted earlier, microgenetic data indicate that, at a given point in time, a subject does not possess just a single strategy but instead selects trategies from a repertory that includes multiple strategies of varying adequacy. Given this situation, assessment on a single occasion within a single content domain may drive an inaccurate characterization of the subjectscompetence (since the subject might have selected a different strategy). As a consequence, studies tha t assess competence across domains are even more wrongdoing prone. To dominate these limitations, in the present work we situate the transfer design in a microgenetic context, substituting new content midway through the observation period.Through this technique we hope to answer a critical question about the generality of the change induced in microgenetic studies as well as to assess transfer in a more dynamic way than it has been approached in the past. 10 STRATEGIES OFKNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION Metacognition,FormalOperations,and ScientificReasoning Piaget (1950; Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1969) offered an explicit account of a developmental progression in strategies of knowledge acquisition. Young children construct rudimentary concepts of the type examined by Keil (1989, 1991) that we referred to earlier.With the advent of concrete operations at the age of 6 or 7, concepts acquire the properties of systematic hierarchic classes. A further major development occurs with the appe arance of formal operations at adolescence, when second-order relations between categories begin to be examined-the skill on which the present Monographfocuses. Piagets notional model of formal operations has been criticized (for a review, see Keating, 1980), and in his later work (Piaget & Garcia, 1991) there is evidence that even he came to regard the model as insufficiently concerned with the meaning of the propositions that subjects contemplated.Empirical research relating to formal operations has been largely think on subjectsability to conduct scientific investigation of the relations between variables in a multivariable context, and here, in contrast, Inhelder and Piagets (1958) pioneering work has been good replicated (Keating, 1980; Moshman, in press). some(prenominal) the methods and the conclusions of scientific investigation are likely to be faulty among subjects younger than midadolescence; moreover, as research accompanying to Inhelder and Piagets has shown, even older adolescents and many a(prenominal) adults often perform poorly as scientists (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al. 1993; Kuhn et al. , 1988; Schauble & Glaser, 1990). Although they did not use the term, Inhelder and Piaget (1958) in effect attributed poor performance in scientific reasoning tasks to metacognitive weakness, defined as the inability to contemplate ones own thought as an object of cognition or, in their (1958) terms, to engage in second-order operations on operations. To the extent that such an ability is truly lacking, the ramifications no doubt extend well beyond the realm of scientific reasoning (Kuhn, 1992a, 1993).Subsequent to Inhelder and Piagets (1958) work, metacognition has become a topic of widespread interest (Flavell, 1979, 1993; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Flavell & Wellman, 1977; ForrestPressley, MacKinnon, & Waller, 1985; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994; Moshman, 1979, 1990, 1995; Schneider, 1985), but the term ha s been variably and often loosely defined, with the majority of investigators employing it in its initial and more restricted sniff out of knowledge and management of ones cognitive strategies, particularly retention strategies.In the present work, we make a distinction between metacognitive knowledge and metastrategic knowledge, a distinction that parallels in many respects the lower-order distinction between declarative and procedural 11 KUHNETAL. knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge involves awareness of and rumination on the content of ones thought, ranging from simple awareness of the content of ones present or immediately prior thought (Flavell et al. , 1995) to reflection on a set of propositions that one believes to be rightful(a) or brings to take under consideration (Moshman, 1990).Metastrategic knowledge involves awareness and management of the strategies that are applied in the caterpillar tread of thinking and problem solving (Sternberg, 1984). Both metacognitive a nd metastrategic knowledge entail treating ones own cognition as itself an object of cognition-a form of cognitive â€Å"distancing”(Sigel, 1993). Both metacognitive and metastrategic knowledge, we will claim, figure importantly in the development of the cognitive skills examined in this Monograph.If knowledge acquisition is a process of theory revision, as we have claimed, to attain the process in a skilled way the individual needs to be aware of and reflect on a theory (metacognitive competence), coordinating it with new evidence by means of strategies that are inferentially toilsome and applied in a consistent modality (metastrategic competence). In the total absence of such competence, evidence and theory are not represented as distinct entities.In this case, new evidence may lead to modification of a theory (as it does even among very young children), but the process takes place outside(a) the individuals conscious control (Kuhn, 1989). There is a problem, however, w ith attributing increase in knowledge acquisition or scientific reasoning to the development of metacognitive or metastrategic competencies emergent at adolescence. Competent scientific reasoning entails a number of component skills, and data exist suggesting that at least rudimentary forms of all these skills are in place well before adolescence.In addition to the metacognitive and metastrategic abilitiesjust discussed, included among these skills are the ability to entertain alternative possibilities, to detect and catch covariation, and to isolate and control variables. One study (Richardson, 1992) in particular stands out for its strong claim of archaeozoic competence. Even young children, the author maintains, readily interpret both additive and interactive effects of leash or more variables-a claim that stands in striking contradiction to data to be presented in this Monographdemonstrating the difficulty that even adults have with such coordinations.The data from Richard sons study, however, cannot be cl archaeozoic interpreted for a number of methodological reasons, foremost among them being the failure to examine individual patterns of performance and distinguish them from group data. The remaining studies of former(a) competence make more modest claims that certain abilities traditionally associated with scientific reasoning are present in rudimentary forms in young children. Sodian, Zaitchik, and Carey (1991), for example, undertook a study to show that young children 12 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION an distinguish between an self-confidence and evidence that bears on the assertion if the context is simple enough. They posed first- and second-grade in their house was a large or minor(ip) one, which they did by placing food in a box overnight. Two boxes were available, one with a large opening (able to accommodate a large or a small creep) and one with a small opening (big enough for only the small mouse to pass through). The subject was asked which of the two boxes the children should put food in. Sodian et al. (1991) report that 11 of 20 first graders and 12 of 14 second graders preferred the determinate firmness of purpose (i. . , chose the small-opening box), indicating both considerable competence and considerable development in this age range. Sodian et al. (1991) note that their subjects performance reflects a specialty of hypothesis and evidence since the hypothesis (large or small mouse) is distinguished from the evidence that will test it (the food disappears or does not). Note, however, that the potential confusion in this case is not between theories and evidence (mice and food) but rather lies in the natural selection of the form of evidence appropriate to test a theory.In a subsequent set of more detailed studies, Ruffman, Perner, Olson, and Doherty (1993) report similar evidence in comparably simple contexts even among some 5- yr-olds (as well as 6- and 7-year-olds). In fact, common observation c onfirms that implicit forms of theory-evidence coordination occur at even earlier ages-illustrated, for example, by a 2-year-old who calls her parents into her bedroom with the claim that it is a g innkeeper in her wardrobe that is the cause of a soft â€Å"whooshing” noise that is keeping her awake.This child understands as well as her parents that opening the closet door will provide the evidence open of disconfirming this causal hypothesis, even though she lacks any metacognitive awareness of her own belief states as hypotheses to be coordinated with evidence. The valuable function served by Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) study is to make clear the connection that exists between early theory-of-mind competencies (Feldman, 1992; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990) and competencies that figure importantly in scientific reasoning.Both have strong metacognitive aspects. The 4-year-old child who comes to recognize that an assertion is not necessarily correct-that the candy can be be lieved to be in the cupboard and in fairness be elsewhere (Perner, 1991)-has achieved an essential milestone in the development of scientific reasoning ability. This child has do at least a primitive differentiation between what a mind theorizes to be true and information from the external world that bears on this theory. trumped-up(prenominal) beliefs, by definition, are subject to disconfirmation by evidence. Although it has ometimes been treated this way in the literature, metacognition, like cognition, is not a zero-one, present-absent phenomenon that emerges in full bloom at a particular point in development. The position subjectsa problemin which some childrenwanted to find out if a mouse 13 KUHNETAL. taken in this Monographis that the development of metacognitive competence, like that of metastrategic competence, takes place very gradually over many geezerhood and involves a process of increasing â€Å"explicitation”(KarmiloffSmith, 1992) of skills present in impli cit form.Metacognitive competence develops from its most rudimentary forms (examined by Flavell and Gopnik and their colleagues in studies to be described shortly) to the more highly developed, explicit forms demanded by the activities in which subjects in the present research engage. Ruffman et al. (1993) illustrate the evolution of early emerging metacognitive capability relevant to scientific reasoning by asking subjects to reason about propositions as belief states (a requirement not present in Sodian et al. ‘s, 1991, study).They date that subjects do so by explicitly characterizing these belief states as false. Many (although not all) of the 5-7-year-olds in their research judged that a story character who observes a set of dolls who usually choose red over commons food will conclude that the dolls like red food, even though the subjects themselves have been told that this is not the true state of affairs (the dolls really like light-green food, the subject is told). I n this respect, the child comprehends the relation between a pattern of evidence and a theory (the contrary-to-fact hypothesis held by the story character).Put in different terms, the child can draw appropriate inferences from contrary-to-fact propositions (an ability that Piaget tied to the emergence of formal operations). In a follow-up experiment, Ruffman et al. showed that this comprehension extends to predictive notions (e. g. , that the dolls will choose red food again). In theory-of-mind terms, these children are lottery appropriate inferences regarding others belief states (or theories, as long as we agree to use this term in its broad sense), even when they have been told that these theories are not correct. The material is deliberately designed so that the childs own theory-based preferences are likely to be neutral. ) The portrayal of early proficiency in metacognitive competencies important to scientific reasoning that Ruffman et al. (1993) offer needs to be qualified , however, by other research demonstrating that the period between 4 and 8 years of age is one of significant development of the basic metacognitive competencies that serve as underpinnings of more involved forms of reasoning about propositions. A series of studies by Flavell et al. 1995) showed 3-5-year-old children to have considerable difficulty accurately insurance coverage either their own immediately preceding mental activity or that of another individual, in contexts in which that mental activity had been particularly clear and salient. In contrast, 7-8-year-olds were largely (although not entirely) successful in such tasks. Distinctions between (second-order) representations (and consequent verbal reports) of thinking about an object and (first-order) representations of the object itself appeared fragile in the younger children.The older ones, like children of a 14 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION similar age in Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) research, were better able to make inferences that depended on representations of mental states. In related work, Gopnik and her colleagues (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Gopnik & Slaughter, 1991) showed that preschoolers have a limited awareness of the source of their beliefs-a metacognitive ability that figures prominently in the work presented in this Monograph.Gopnik and Graf (1988) found that, even in very simple situations, 3- and 4-year-olds could not identify where knowledge they had just acquired had come from-for example, whether they had learned the contents of a drawer from seeing them or being told about them. Performance was significantly improved, however, among 5-year-olds. Some of Gopnik and Grafs 3- and 4-year-olds might even have been successful in Sodian et al. ‘s (1991) task of differentiating and coordinating a theory (about a mouses size) and evidence (of food eaten or not) bearing on it, but they showed remarkablylittle differentiation of theory and evidence at he metacognitive level of distinguishing the representation of what they knew (the contents of the drawer) from a representation of the evidence that had provided this knowledge. formerly the knowledge was acquired, the two seemingly became fused into a single representation that encompassed only the knowledge itself. Supporting this interpretation are other findings showing that preschool children report that they have â€Å"always known” knowledge that was just acquired in the experimental situation (Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett, 1994).Evidence regarding early strategic (as opposed to metastrategic or metacognitive) competence related to scientific reasoning is largely positive. Ruffman et al. ‘s (1993) study substantiates that one of several simple strategic competencies entailed in scientific reasoning-inferring causality from covariation evidence-poses no great difficulty among young children, as earlier research had shown (Mendelson & Shul tz, 1976; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). Indeed, this ability is evident at the sensorimotor level in human infants (Piaget, 1952) as well as in nonhuman organisms.By the end of the first year of life, infants have begun to make causal inferences based on the juxtaposition of an spring and an outcome. As data in the present illustrate, it is the fact that this inference strategy is overlearned Monograph that causes problems. Precursors to the critical control-of-variables strategy most closely associated with scientific reasoning are also evident. Most elementary among these are judgments of comparison, first in terms of an individual (Can I run straightaway than my brother? , later in terms of groups of individuals (Can the girls in the class run faster than the boys? ). Once the concept of a fair comparison emerges (What if the boys wore running shoes and the girls didnt? ), it remains only to validate the comparison into the framework of a controlled test of relations between variables (gender and running speed). 15 KUHNETAL. Case (1974) has shown that, although they do not do so spontaneously, children as young as age 8 can readily be taught to carry out controlled comparisons.Early developing forms of metastrategic competence are also evident. A skill important to scientific reasoning is recognition of the indeterminacy associated with socialise alternative possibilities. This skill is explored in a line of research beginning with studies by Pieraut-Le Bonniec (1980). During the early puerility years, children develop the ability to discriminate between situations that have determinate solutions and those that do not or, in other words, to know whether they have an answer-a competency having clear metastrategic aspects. For a review of research, see Acredolo & OConnor, 1991, or Byrnes & Beilin, 1991. ) The study by Sodian et al. (1991) can also be interpreted in these terms. In the face of evidence of all this early competence, a perplexing problem is to explain the glum poor performance of children, adolescents, and many adults in fully fledged scientific reasoning tasks, that is, ones in which they are asked to examine a database and draw conclusions (Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr et al. , 1993; Kuhn et al. 1988; Schauble & Glaser, 1990). Addressing this critical question is an important objective of the present Monograph. With repeated exercise, we find, knowledge acquisition strategies improve among most subjects, but these strategies remain error prone and inadequate among many adults as well as children. Microgenetic data will, we hope, provide insight into the obstacles that kibosh success in these fundamental forms of reasoning and knowledge acquisition. We therefore return to this question after the data have been presented.Inductive Causal Inferencein Multivariable Contexts It is a curiosity that research on scientific reasoning (originating and remaining largely in the developmental literature) h as proceeded independently of and remains largely unintegrated with research on multivariable inductive causal inference (centered in the adult cognition literature). The central difference between the two is a simple one. Whereas studies of scientific reasoning typically involve selecting instances to create a database, studies of inductive causal inference involve presenting instances from a database for examination.In both, however, the subject must interpret the evidence and draw conclusions, these conclusions being the end product of the process in both cases. Kuhn and Brannock (1977) argued that the â€Å"natural experiment” situation involved in studies of inductive inference elicits forms of reasoning paralleling those identified in earlier studies of isolation of variables within the framework of formal operations and scientific reasoning. 16 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITIONAlthough there exists a large literature on the development of causal inference (for a revi ew, see Bullock, 1985; Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Sedlak & Kurtz, 1981), with the exception of our own developmental studies (Kuhn & Brannock, 1977; Kuhn & Phelps, 1982; Kuhn et al. , 1988) conjectural and empirical work on multivariable causal inference has largely been located in the adult cognition literature. Like much of the literature on scientific reasoning development, the developmental literature on causal inference highlights the childs early competence.As noted earlier, from an early age children draw on covariation information, as well as other cues, as a basis for inferences of causality (Mendelson & Shultz, 1976; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975). Equally important, from an early age they have theories of causal mechanism that influence their causal judgments (Shultz, 1982), a finding consonant with the more recent conceptual change literature. Within the adult literature, theoretical analysis has focused largely on covariation as the most important source of information about causality.Mills (1843/1973) ‘ colligation method of agreement and difference” identifies covariation as the appropriate basis for inferences of causality, and Kelleys (1967) extensively researched attribution model similarly rests on covariation between antecedent and outcome. More recent investigators have followed in this tradition but have want to identify more precisely the inductive strategies that mediate between a covariational database and an inference of causality.In empirical studies, typically a set of multivariable instances is presented in written form and the subject asked to judge what inferences can be pull (Briggs, 1991; Cheng & Novick, 1990; Downing et al. , 1985; Schustack & Sternberg, 1981). On the basis of such data, Schustack and Sternberg (1981) developed a linear regression model to define weights to five types of covariation information. The first four are frequencies of the joint presence o f antecedent and outcome, the joint absence of antecedent and outcome, the presence of antecedent and the absence of outcome, and the bsence of antecedent and the presence of outcome. A fifth factor is the strength of competing causes. Although adult subjects show consistency, leading to positive regression weights for the first two frequencies and negative weights for the second two, Cheng and Novick (1992) identify several theoretical anomalies in the linear regression model, for example, the role of base-level frequencies of antecedent and outcome in predicting the likelihood of a causal inference, factors that intuitively should not affect the causal status of the antecedent.An even more critical problem, however, for such models of induction purely from an empirical database is the sheer computational weight of the task. The four frequencies in the Schustack and Sternberg model adjoin to a single potential cause and outcome. Once the causal field is opened to a host of causal c andidates (as it is in natural settings), the computational 17 KUHNETAL. burden quickly becomes enormous. Some means of restricting the causal field to a set of pliable factors is needed.Different approaches have been taken to accomplishing this objective, but they have in common restriction of the set of potential causes to the â€Å"set of events considered relevant by the attributor” (Cheng & Novick, 1990, p. 562). In other words, theoretical expectation on the part of the subject, arising from a exist knowledge base, is recruitd as a factor in the attribution of causality. Cheng and Novick (1990, 1992) propose that, within this focal set, inferences of causality are based on estimated differences in the probabilities of the effect in the presence versus the absence of the potential cause.Hilton and Slugoski (1986) designate â€Å"abnormal conditions”-those absent in a comparison condition-as the ones likely to be attributed as causes. Both models invoke t he distinction emphasized by Mackie (1974) and others (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986) between causes and modify conditions. In Cheng and Novicks (1992) model, factors yielding substantial differences across instances will be attributed as causes, whereas factors that are constant across instances will be either regarded as enabling conditions, if they are perceived as relevant, or dismissed as causally irrelevant (and hence excluded from the focal set).Note that the latter distinction rests entirely on the subjects theoretical belief. Covariation within a focal set of instances may well provide the basis for a judgment of causality, but, when this covariation is absent, theoretical belief offers the only basis for discernment whether constant factors are causally relevant (as enabling conditions) or noncausal. Studies in the adult causal inference literature have tended to focus only on inferences of causality, treating inferences of noncausality almost as noninferences.They have n ot addressed the converse of the covariation principle-evidence of noncovariation over a set of instances as a basis for an inference of noncausality-or in general examined how empirical evidence might play a role in inferences of noncausality. As discussed in the next section, we see noncausal inference as occupying a prominent place in inductive inference, scientific reasoning, and knowledge acquisition, and these inferences are a central object of attention in the present work.We also pay a good deal of attention to another problem that Cheng and Novick (1992) acknowledge is not addressed by their model-inferences of causality based on spurious covariation of a noncausal factor with an outcome. The fact that we examine inductive inference over a period of time as a database of instances accumulates enables us to observe how a subject may gradually overcome the lure of this invalid inference strategy as well as more generally how the subject coordinates accumulating new evidence with theoretical expectation.Most studies of causal inference have confined subjects to the presentation of a single set of instances 18 STRATEGIES KNOWLEDGE OF ACQUISITION on a single occasion (with data analysis typically confined to the group level). In contrast, we ask subjects to seek out the evidence that they believe adequate to support their causal and noncausal inferences, and we follow them individually in their efforts to interpret this evidence and integrate it with existing knowledge.We turn now to an examination of the inference strategies that individuals might employ as they engage in this task. AND NONcausal CAUSAL STRATEGIES INDUCTIVE OF INFERENCE Causal Inference(Inclusion) On what evidence might someone base the inference that antecedent a has a causal influence on outcome o? In the framework choose here, we assume a multivariable context, and we assume that the individual is able to select instances to attend to. The question facing the individual is whether a particular factor a makes a difference to the outcome.For easiness of exposition, we consider the case in which the identified factors-a, b, c, d, and e-are dichotomous (two-level) variables. (Certain differences arise if the two levels of these variables are treated as presence and absence, but, again for simplicity of exposition, they need not be taken into consideration here, and the two levels of each variable will be designated by the subscripts 1 and 2. ) A further assumption that we make is that selection of instances is at least part theory motivated.In other words, the individuals prior beliefs about the causal and noncausal status of the identified factors influence the selection of instances to attend to. This selectivity takes a variety of forms that need not be identified in detail at this point; some examples are the tendencies to select instances believed to produce the most positive level of an outcome (a success rather than an explanation orientation) and to fail to investigate factors that are believed noncausal.A minimal (but, as we shall document, frequent) basis for the inference that an antecedent a and an outcome o are causally related-an inference to which we refer henceforth as the inclusionof a-is their co-occurrence within a multivariable context: al blcdl el — ol. (1) We refer to such an inference as a co-occurrence false inclusion inference (because a and o merely co-occur on one occasion). Such inferences are based on only a single instance and are of course invalid since the cooccurrence does not establish that a played a causal role in producing o. 19KUHNETAL. In the case in which an individual selects at least two instances for examination, an informative second instance would be (2a) a2b c1d1el †02. Such an instance, with the outcome shown, allows the valid inclusion inference that a is causally implicated in o. This inference, based on two instances, is the product of a controlled comparison. In most natural sett ings, however, people do not have the luxury of selecting for observation exactly those instances that would be most informative with respect to the inferences they al\r\n'